John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty presents a powerful defense of freedom of opinion, action, and individual lifestyle. Throughout the book, it is clear that he begins from a standpoint of optimism in the capacity of individuals, and a great respect of their potential to become dignified beings through developing their faculties. His entire project is devoted to the full development of the mental, moral, and physical capabilities of individuals. The main force behind his work is that individuals cannot reach their full mental and moral potential if they are uncritical and unthinking in their actions and words. For a man to reach his full potential, he must thoroughly know the reasons behind his own actions and beliefs. He must make an informed judgment, and it is impossible to make a properly informed judgment unless one knows the strongest arguments of all sides. This capacity for reasoned judgment is what elevates man above animals and machines; and through a society that encourages the development and use of this capacity, all individuals will be elevated to their fullest potential. Mill attacks the question of what type of government enable this type of society. In this sense, Mill’s work is in the same spirit as Plato’s Republic. His answer is short and clear: a democratic state that holds tightly to his refined Harm principle, which states that the State may only intervene in situations where an individual fails to fulfill a distinct and assignable responsibility to his other members of society. We can see how Mill’s project directly informs his vision for what such a state would look like. The state must be democratic as such a state enables the use of man’s capacity for rational judgment. The state must only intervene in cases where his refined Harm principle applies as in all other cases it would unjustifiably be again interfering with man’s capacity for rational judgment, limiting his development and reducing him to an automaton. From the Harm principle, freedom of opinion, action, and lifestyle trivially follow.
Despite the beautiful principles from which Mill informs his work and derives his Harm principle, he needs to defend his Harm principle from those who don’t share his founding principles and his optimism in human nature. This portion composes the bulk of his work; defending his principles against all possible objections that he has heard or he can come up with, performing a full, honest philosophical inquiry into the validity of his Harm principle. There were several particularly interesting arguments in defense of freedom of opinion. The infallibility argument argues that any state initiative to suppress a particular point of view assumes the infallibility of the state, which is clearly an incorrect assumption, as the state is composed of men and men are fallible. To the objection that there are some values of which we are so sure of that under careful consideration, so that we may be justified in using the state to censor alternative viewpoints, Mill raises the example of Marcus Aurelius. He calls Marcus Aurelius “the most Christian of the pagans”, highlighting how he was the first emperor to question how beneficial his role really was to the Roman Empire, and that he meditated deeply on the question of virtue and what is the good life, comiing to conclusions that were deeply Christian. Despite this, he still brutally oppressed and censored the Christians, despite their doctrine being a clear step forward in the moral evolution of humanity, and his own views aligning with those of the Christians. Another of one Mill’s particularly interesting arguments for the diversity of ideas and viewpoints was that in any subject in which there is permitted lively and widespread debate, the followers of a doctrine understand much more thoroughly the premises and arguments that compose and argue in favor of their doctrine. Additionally, in this state of affairs, the followers of a doctrine feel that their doctrine is much more alive and active, and more thoroughly live by its principles. He gives the example of the Christians, again: when they were persecuted, even their enemies remarked “Oh those Christians, how they love each other.” He contrasts this with the Christians of his day, who had a vague awareness of the principles of Christianity, yet rarely put into practice the doctrine that they proclaimed to adhere to so tightly. Clearly, the achievement of a hegemonic position for Christianity led to a decline in the actual practice of Christianity by Christians. The principles having diffused into the larger culture, its followers had no contrast which would allow them to become aware of its principle, to feel those principles alive in them, and have their actions driven by these principles. To the objection that, having found the “truth”, it is desirable to have it diffuse into the general culture, become hegemonic, and not have men make the mistakes of the past for the purpose of having the adherents of the truth be more thoroughly acquainted with it, Mill proposes that the system of education must step into this role. For any matters which are considered settled, citizens must be made aware of the strongest of arguments of the alternative viewpoints, such that they gain an appreciation of the difficulty of arriving to the truth of the matter considered settled, and understand the liveliness and difficulty of the debate that led to the conclusion. Having done so and understood the difficulty of arriving to the principles they have today, and thus the value of them, citizens will not only better abide by those principles, but will be more dignified in doing so, as they can now do it out of an informed, rational judgment, rather than out of mere habit. The last, most interesting, and most brutal objection to which Mill responds is the idea that truth must pass through a trial of persecution. This objection stems from the idea that truth cannot be suppressed forever, and thus persecution of the adherents of the truth will do no harm to the truth itself. Mill attacks this objection from several angles: remarking mainly that the belief that men hold that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods which are repeated until they are believed. He remarks that this dictum appears to be correct because there are truths which have been discovered repeatedly throughout history, and were repressed multiple times until they were discovered in more favorable circumstances. Noting that there are instances in which the repression of the truth held back humanity for centuries, he argues that we cannot let the triumph of the truth be left to mere chance.
On Liberty, after presenting its main values and principles, ends with an applications of these values and principles to real and present problems of the time. Mill recognizes the limits of his principles, and does not claim that his principles alone are sufficient to answer all questions of governance. For example, while the principle of individual liberty recognizes that it is best to leave people to come to their own agreements rather than imposing an agreement onto them, it is not sufficient to delineate the degree of control that should be exerted by the government in questions of prevention of fraud by adulteration, health and safety standards, etc. Mill recognizes that government force (beyond rational persuasion) is legitimate in these circumstances, and only wishes that the principle of individual liberty is kept in mind when answering these questions, and that the answers to these questions are rational; that the laws put in place really do have the intended effect in preventing fraud and ensuring health and safety, while not imposing too great of a burden in other respects. Recognizing the limits of his principles, Mill turns his attention to areas where his principles do have strong applicability. He uses the sale of poisons to demonstrate several important nuances of his principles, as they are a commercial good that may be used for both nefarious and beneficial purposes. First, he thinks it is just that the state mandate that all poisons are labeled as such. This is because he views it as the proper office of the state to prevent unfortunate accidents. He argues, however, that once the buyer is sufficiently informed about the dangers of what they are purchasing, the state has no right to coercion to prevent the buyer from purchasing the poison. Next, he investigates the precautions the state ought to take for the prevention of crimes perpetuated using poisons. He is very hesitant about enabling the state to prevent crimes, recognizing that this opens up practically all actions to regulation and inspection by the state. However, he admits that the prevention of crimes of this magnitude is a legitimate role of the state, and he seeks that discourages access to poison for illegitimate use while not providing a material impediment to access for legitimate use. For this, he recommends that at the sale of any poison, the details of the sale are recorded, including the time, date, amount, and purchaser, and that a third party must be present to witness the sale and the creation of the records. He argues that this provides a legitimate interference to the acquisition of poison for illegitimate purposes, while not interfering with those who wish to seek it for a legitimate reason. Another area in which he tests his principles and derives the action to be taken is those areas in which, while the harm stemming from the individual engaging in a particular action is mainly limited to the individual himself, the act of engaging in these actions is harmful to society at large. He is specifically referring to actions such as fornication and gambling. He unequivocally maintains that those that engage in these actions must be tolerated and not persecuted. However, the question of allowing the existence of those that profit from these actions – such as pimps and the owners of gambling-houses – is another question, because the incentives of these individuals are directly opposed to society’s benefit. Mill is not fully decided on this question. He acknowledges that it would be logically inconsistent to tolerate the buyer but not the seller. Yet he is not satisfied with giving the seller free reign to pursue his profit at extents that would be reasonable for other businesses. He seems to arrive at the compromise that for matters such as prostitution and gambling, neither the buyer nor seller should be persecuted, but the acquisition of these services should be limited to those that actively seek them out. Places to obtain and engage in these services should not be in the public view of society. This would imply a prohibition on all forms of advertising for these services. The authority of the state to impose such restrictions, despite it seemingly being against Mill’s previous assertions of the fallibility of the state and the right of individuals to determine best what is towards their own good, would derive from the recognition that whether these services are harmful or not is a disputable question; and that the state has the right to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, and are for their personal gain only. It is clear that the questions Mill tackles remain real and present in current society. There are clear parallels in the debate with the sale of poisons and the gun control debate, and the legalization of certain drugs. There is one final interesting application of his principles that Mill presents that is will be highlighted. Mill tackles the question of taxation of substances which have a potentially adverse effect on society and other individuals – such as alcohol. Mill is not against these taxation when their justification does not conflict with the principles of individual liberty. He thinks the taxation of such stimulants in order to discourage their consumption is wrong. First, he notes that for some, the taxation will essentially serve as a prohibition, as the price becomes out of reach for such individuals. Thus, we should treat taxes meant to discourage consumption as a form of prohibition. Secondly, falling back on his principles, he does not see it as the place of the government to discourage individuals from a behavior through taxation. Dignified individuals must be discouraged of harmful behavior only through appealing to their rationality, thus respecting their dignity. However, this does not mean that there must be no taxation on stimulants or certain products – and that in fact, such “harmful” products such as stimulants should still be taxed. He arrives at this conclusion in the following manner. First, he notes the inevitability of taxation. Governments must enact taxes in order to fund their functions. Given this inevitability, a rational allocation of tax burden would place the largest tax burden on the least morally correct and least socially beneficial actions and goods. Thus, he approves of taxation of stimulants up to the point where they generate the largest revenue. This allows a smaller tax burden on necessary and beneficial behaviors and goods, the production of which must be encouraged. Thus, it appears that for Mill, the acceptability of a policy is not to be determined purely by its effects and actions; the chosen justification and intention of a policy, even if multiple possible justifications and intentions would lead to the same policy, must not conflict with his harm principle and individual liberty.
I think the part that I enjoyed most about On Liberty was the beautiful optimism Mill had in the capacity of individuals, and the society that would result from exploiting this capacity. He truly believed that as reading and public education became widespread, we would all be elevated and empowered in a way that would make us truly free and dignified. I think it is clear that we have not reached this state. Most citizens feel disempowered, correctly recognizing that they have little active participation in government. However, I still believe in Mill’s vision, although I think the challenges to achieving such a society are much greater than he expected. The education system he described that would train citizens ready to participate in such a society never arose, partially because it was never necessary. I think back to ancient Athens, with its radical democracy where many positions were filled by lot and the constant number of public assemblies that citizens had to attend. This was the sort of government that required for its own survival that citizens be well-informed, educated, and capable of rational thought, and thus was forced to take provisions and foster a culture in which citizens could meet these requirements. Even before being allowed to vote in assemblies, citizens would have had observed a good number of such assemblies, and would be immersed in a culture that recognizes the consequences of each person’s opinions, and the importance of factual correctness. Today’s parliamentary governments do not require those kind of citizens. The barriers to becoming a legislator are high enough such that legislators that are elected generally have the level of education and rationality to make non-disastrous decisions regardless of their voter base, and thus whether or not voters themselves hold the correct beliefs has little consequence. There is little benefit to being “right” on an issue, because one can very rarely argue for that position themselves in front of any assembly with real, actionable power. When the consequences of having an incorrect opinion on a policy has so little impact on one’s everyday life, it is not surprising that we see such a multitude of opinions that are motivated more by ideology and identity (which does have a direct impact on most individuals’ daily life) than correct opinion. This in turn explains the current state of debate seen on social media sites such as YouTube, which are more interested in “destroying” the other side instead of getting to the truth. Without a mechanism to transform belief into action, there is little incentive or consequence of getting to the truth during a debate, while “destroying” the other side can have an enormous positive effect on one’s in-group standing. Thus, the parliamentary governments which were flourishing in Mill’s time, were not sufficient to push humanity to this higher, more dignified state that Mill dreamed of. Rather, it created the conditions that impede the creation of a government which would enable this state. The increasing state of polarization and blind adherence to ideology allowed by such parliamentary governments make its citizens even more opposed to the most powerful measure which would create citizens interested in forming their beliefs to match fact, not ideology and identity. This measure would be the introduction of the powerfully democratic means of legislation, where average citizens could turn their ideas into real, enforceable policy. This would force citizens to align their beliefs with fact to a greater degree, as they would at least partially suffer the consequences for misalignment. However, as everyone at least tacitly recognizes the other side of not being based in fact but in ideology, everyone prefers the current system as opposed to seeing the current beliefs of the other side actually having some chance of being put into practice. Thus, we are stuck at an impasse where the poor state of political debate and culture makes it difficult to take any measure which would encourage a better state, and the education system that Mill dreamed of will never be possible in this state because the significant effort required to realize it will only be taken if it is necessary; but it will never be necessary so long as the beliefs of citizens have little impact on realized policy. I do think that there is hope, however, and I will also explore more of Mill’s ideas as applied to current issues in another post.
All You Distrust 